In discussing the spread of autocratic or otherwise anti-democratic forces, there is a tendency to frame such trends through the broad umbrella term of “autocracy promotion”. It is a seductive term, one that conjures images of secret operations conducted by supervillain spymasters seeking to bring about a dangerous new world order for the sake of it. While alluring in its conspiracy, this might not be the case. Many discrete objectives can often be missed by an umbrella term such as autocracy promotion. Some of these objectives might exist in some “autocracy promotion” acts, but not exist in others. The respective remedies and counterplays might also change accordingly.  Through going through the most prominent of these different objectives, we might gain a better idea of what autocracy promotion is and how to react to it.

International System Level

The current order does not provide security for its political system. Beijing has consistently seen “the West” as seeking to overturn China’s socialist system via “peaceful evolution” and worried about “hostile Western forces” combining with forces within China to “split” the country and change its political system. Xi has repeatedly echoed these views and at the 19th Party Congress employed several phrases designed to invoke them, including the Chinese proverb “consider danger in times of peace” (a euphemism for the collapse of the Soviet Union). As a result of these fears, China’s top leaders for decades have asserted that a new international economic and political order ought to be built…

Daniel Tobin, National Intelligence University
Testimony before the U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission

Firstly, Autocracy Promotion can refer to changing an International System to advantage autocratic systems more. The International System can be taken to encompass various multinational and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, IMF and Interpol as well as global markets, financial institutions, media ecosystems and trade networks more broadly. This great mass of institutions is commonly believed to punish autocratic systems and reward democratic systems. For instance, to secure loans from the World Bank or IMF, developing countries must often demonstrate progress towards inclusive institutions, popular electoral accountability and rule of law and by implicit extension, democratisation. Transparency is also often considered an obligation for global health governance, particularly concerning contagious diseases and pandemics. Democratisation is also often promoted by organisations like the UN as a method of development and conflict resolution, while democratic values are deeply embedded in UN definitions of Human Rights. Even in the cyber governance sphere, technologies and new spaces like the Internet and social media are usually internationalised by default, ignoring the sovereign borders and information controls that autocracies tend to guard more closely. This is sometimes contested by progressive theorists who contend that the international system favours autocracy. They would point to international financial institutions’ support for, profiteering off and possibly even reliance on massive amounts of corruption, which both feeds and is fed by autocracy. 

Regardless, autocrats are still incentivized towards shaping an international system that is friendly (or friendlier) towards autocrats. So far, only China is the only autocracy with enough economic and demographic clout to be able to accomplish this on a global level. However, it has certainly played its part. Through its Belt and Road Initiative programmes, China provides an alternative source of investment and developmental aid that does not make stringent reviews of transparency, inclusive institutions, popular legitimacy or corruption. Instead, BRI programmes often use Chinese labour, systemically encourage corruption and offer propaganda and cybersecurity training as a means to repress anti-Chinese sentiment to clients like Tanzania. This provides a far more hospitable ecosystem for autocracies to persist. Instead of making painful choices between isolation and democratisation, they can thrive and even sharpen their repressive apparatus through engagement with others. As a result, BRI creates alternative engagement models within the international system that shift the entire system towards favouring autocracy more.

It is worth noting that China’s shaping of the international system may not strictly be linked to a pro-autocracy tendency. In many cases, its preferences might stem more from national interest than regime-type preference. Its inbuilt precondition of Taiwanese non-recognition for BRI investment might appear pro-autocratic, for instance. Yet on closer inspection, it only promotes autocracy or degrades democracy through the rather abstract and indirect channels of reducing international democratic solidarity and reducing the legitimacy of one democracy out of many. Similarly, its desire to create more inclusive international Arctic governance is neither rather agnostic to regime-type preferences. Hence, it is vital to not let the case study, by merit of its sheer size and significance, end up hijacking the definition and the logic of international system-level autocracy promotion. Similar care should be applied to region-system autocracy promotion cases, arguably present in organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 

State to State Level

While there are many foreign policy academics and practitioners that doubt the importance, and even existence, of an international system, it is largely consensus that states matter. Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that the most substantial autocracy promotion behaviours occur in the state to state space. Nevertheless, many intentions lie within state-to-state autocracy promotion and it pays to dig into them one by one.

Firstly, states might be targeted by autocracy promotion to make them more like-minded. There can be nuanced variations of why exactly having like-minded fellow autocracies is desirable for autocrats, but it can be broadly attributed to domestic politics. Autocracies often live in insecurity of the brutality of their political model, and having a constellation of fellow autocrats can be reassuring. Conversely, being surrounded by a gang of democracies can make an autocrat feel highly insecure. Ideological compulsions or threat perceptions can also come into place here. Some ideologies like Leninism or Islamism often valorize and reward the export of their ideology, and hence autocrats seeking to gain legitimacy from living up to sacred national doctrine might seek to pursue such courses of action. Conversely, the failure to accomplish such a duty could sap domestic legitimacy from the autocrat in question. One example of this could be Chinese support for North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. While the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi would later sour and even plunge into war, the function of establishing a like-minded border state would remain accomplished, and its benefits resilient. Even with strained relations, there would be no democracy in Hanoi to delegitimize Beijing’s political system and Zhongnanhai could crow about successfully spreading the revolution abroad despite American opposition.

States might also be targeted by autocracy promotion to make them more compliant. Pluralistic societies are often fickle subordinates, as their publics might misalign or even be hostile to subjugation. The resilience of popularly legitimated democracies might also make them more formidable and hence troublesome to manage. In contrast, insecure autocratic systems that are afraid of their people might prove more accommodating to foreign suzerainty in exchange for regime security assistance. Autocratic subject states are also more able to perform (and force their populations to participate in) demeaning rites and rituals that imperial overlords might demand as part of their imperial privilege. As such, making societies more exclusive and autocratic can prove productive in their colonisation, whether it be as a garrison, plantation, mine or vanity project. One case study of this could be that of Manchukuo, the state set up in Manchuria by Japan in 1931. Despite the nominal replication of the Japanese constitution and monarchy within the colony, there were stark differences between the two governments in practice. Manchukuo’s Kangde Emperor held far less power than Japan’s Showa Emperor, frequently constrained by and reliant on his Japanese minders and commanding none of the procedural significance and national worship. The state itself proved more a utopian Pan-Asian project and military garrison than any coherent or organic nation-state. Similarly, the subject governments of European colonisation were often constructed on corporate-autocratic models.

Finally, states may also be targeted by autocracy promotion simply to make them weaker.  Given that regime-type is usually deeply integrated within the state structure, attacking the democratic regime of a state might be a particularly vulnerable or fruitful act of sabotage against the broader state. For instance, Russia attacks Ukraine’s democracy, through means rhetorical, military and covert. However, it is likely not doing so to make Ukraine more like-minded or compliant. While not particularly well-governed, Ukraine still possesses an eager and active democracy. Even if it were fragile, the party which would most likely succeed Ukrainian democratic collapse would be the neo-nazi militia. As ideological fanatics, they are very different from the Russian mix of securocracy and technocracy which disdains ideologies and popular politics. They are also staunchly anti-Russian, often seeing themselves as defenders of their imagined Western Civilization against the Asiatic Hordes. Hence, it is unlikely that Russia is pursuing any political, partisan or ideological modus vivendi with Ukraine. 

Instead, Russian action appears to simply be to attack an especially exposed and fleshy part of Ukrainian institutions. To borrow an Israeli term, this could be referred to as an ideological form of “mowing the grass”, keeping Ukraine off-balance and disrupted, hence maintaining a balance of power favourable to the Kremlin. Such acts do not aim to topple systems or regimes and may even be fiercely hostile to such contingencies – which in this case would be a genuinely fascist Ukrainian government. Instead, the endgame could be to use this favourable balance of power to secure a formal diplomatic resolution or to simply keep such operations running in perpetuity as a form of problem management. 

Internal Level

One of the forms of autocracy promotion that proves more difficult to deal with would be the development of certain technologies and techniques that promote autocracy. In the same way that there are technologies that can inherently, intentionally or structurally (each distinct) create greater water or air pollution, there are certain technologies and techniques that either directly cause or incentivize greater autocracy promotion. For instance, the advancement of facial recognition technology, better CCTV cameras or surveillance drones or intelligent surveillance networks that can integrate all other systems certainly does increase the power of a police state. In terms of international relations, this would not be very troubling but for the fact that technology spreads. This can be done intentionally through deliberate export, unintentionally through copycat techniques and reverse engineering or despite best intentions through industrial and technological espionage. 

For an example of technology export, one can look at the transfer of Chinese surveillance technology to Venezuela. Building on techniques, codes and technologies developed in China, telecom corporation ZTE developed an export-friendly version of its national identity card database which could effectively consolidate and track voting patterns, health information and financial details. Conversely, the case study of NSO Group’s Pegasus system demonstrates how democracies can emit autocracy promotion as well. Pegasus, a set of cutting-edge surveillance tools developed by the Israeli NSO Group was sold to Arab and African autocracies that used it to spy on political opponents and international rivals.

Finally, autocracies can spread autocracy simply through strong perceived socioeconomic and geopolitical performance and status. By providing a development model that seems successful, or at least a political model that seems to secure the future of its ruling class, autocracies can prompt democracies, infant systems or hybrid regimes to move in their direction. Once again, China is commonly cited as the most prominent example of such a form of autocracy promotion. This came into particularly sharp focus in the early COVID era of 2020 where the governance approach and social contexts produced by Chinese autocracy was cited as a key factor behind a seemingly quick and effective recovery from the initial Wuhan outbreak while leading democracies such as the US and UK seemed to writhe in policy confusion and governance incoherence, resulting in greater infection, death and economic damage.

However, this case study is also instructive in how troublesome status-based autocracy promotion can be in analysis and countermeasure planning. For one, ascribing China’s success to its autocratic system can be done just as much by overseas actors such as independent pro-autocracy activists and blame-shifting leaders as by Beijing. Indeed, the CCP has incentives to ascribe whatever COVID success it does have not to the broad concept of autocracy, but specific national spirits, party doctrine or Xi Jinping’s leadership skills. Secondly, it is unfeasible and unconscionable to build policy around preventing all autocracies from ever being successful at anything. Indeed, one should celebrate autocracies, particularly friendly autocracies, that have success in fighting common problems like disease, piracy and terrorism. Even from an adversarial lens, this can be a good geopolitical strategy as a state acknowledged to be powerful is a state with greater obligations to take on the burdens of global burdens. 

Conclusion

Instead of autocracy “promotion”, it might be more useful to think of autocracy spread through the lens of “pollution”. Firstly, pollution comes from all avenues. States, companies big and small, and even ordinary people contribute to pollution. Similarly, autocracy spread can come from a wide range of actors, individual, corporate, government or intergovernmental. Secondly, these causes of pollution can have a wide variation in intentions and intentionalities. They can be acts of intentional sabotage, malicious negligence, unintentional leakages or painful tradeoffs and gambles for development and human prosperity. Lastly, autocracy spread is usually not an easily targetable operation. Even if directed at specific targets, it often has an unavoidably large arc of fire and collateral zone, as well as second and third-order impacts and victims.

For states that view democracy positively, this frame of autocratic pollution can be used to depoliticize regulating autocratic spread. Much like regional partners regulating smog, states can acknowledge the autocracy-promoting leakages emanating from themselves as negative and seek support and cooperative strategies to resolve and mitigate, without questioning intentions and good faith. The Israeli case study comes up particularly sharply in focus here. While optimal for democracy-democracy dyads, this framework could also be used in partnership with friendly autocracies that value their system but recognize the trepidation and negative reception that its leakage abroad would elicit in others. 

For states that do not view democracy as an inherent or normative good, this piece can serve to caution them against wholeheartedly bandwagoning on the autocracy promotion of others. While the variation in intents and intentionalities can stretch out to the benign and unintentional, it can also extend to the deliberately destructive, coercive or otherwise geopolitically malign. Often, autocracy promotion must be viewed with even more suspicion than the democracy promotion that authoritarians across the world already glare at with suspicion.

Lastly, for this analysis, I used autocracy promotion and democracy erosion rather interchangeably. While the two are often bundled together, it is important to note that this link is not inherent as the two are not necessarily always diametrically opposed. For instance, devolved rule by local warlords or tribal leaders fit neither the democratic nor autocratic ideal. Furthermore, corruption could in different contexts facilitate or hamper autocratic centralization. I do not believe that this simplification and shorthand affected this particular analysis, but it is important to note when trying to work with my conclusions.

Further Reading

1. Applebaum, A. (2021, November 15). The Bad Guys Are Winning. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/12/the-autocrats-are-winning/620526/
2. Berwick, A. (2018, November 14). A new Venezuelan ID, created with China’s ZTE, tracks citizen behavior. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-zte/
3. Brandt, J. (2021, March 28). Washington Needs a Plan for Pushing Back on Autocratic Advances. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog.com/washington-needs-plan-pushing-back-autocratic-advances
4. Burnell, P. (2010). Is there a new autocracy promotion? 24.
5. Carothers, T. (2008). Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future? 18.
6. Cooley, A., & Nexon, D. (2021, April 7). The Illiberal Tide. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-26/illiberal-tide
7. Dossani, R., Bouey, J., & Zhu, K. (2020). Demystifying the Belt and Road Initiative: A Clarification of its Key Features, Objectives and Impacts. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1338.html
8. Economy, E. (2021, December 9). Xi Jinping’s New World Order. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-09/xi-jinpings-new-world-order
9. Full Text: Fu Ying’s speech at Chatham House in London—Chinadaily.com.cn. (2016, August 7). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2016-07/08/content_26021696.htm
10. Hilton, I. (2020, November 21). China says autocracy works better. Covid tolls will lead people to conclude it’s right. Prospect Magazine. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/china-covid-19-coronavirus-caes-death-toll-democracy
11. Kofman, M. (2018, June 14). Russia’s Great Power Raiding Strategy. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/
12. Lime, N. A. and M. L. (2021, November 19). How digital espionage tools exacerbate authoritarianism across Africa. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-digital-espionage-tools-exacerbate-authoritarianism-across-africa/
13. Rahman, O. H. (2021, February 7). U.S. Support Is Keeping the Undemocratic Palestinian Authority Alive. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/02/nizar-banat-palestinian-authority-pa-abbas-survive-without-us-support/
14. Scott, B. (2021, July 21). Defending the liberal international order. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/defending-liberal-international-order
15. Sedaca, N. B., & Bouchet, N. (2014). HOLDING STEADY? US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN A CHANGING WORLD. 30.
16. Shandra, A., & Seely, R. (n.d.). The Surkov Leaks: The Inner Workings of Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine. Retrieved 5 December 2021, from https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/surkov-leaks-inner-workings-russias-hybrid-war-ukraine
17. Smith, J. M. (2021, April 20). In an Age of China Rising, Has U.S. Democracy Promotion Lost Its Edge as a Foreign Policy Goal? The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/age-china-rising-has-us-democracy-promotion-lost-its-edge-foreign-policy-goal
18. Tansey, O. (2016). The problem with autocracy promotion. Democratization, 23, 141–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1095736
19. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (n.d.). Retrieved 21 April 2021, from https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/SFR%20for%20USCC%20TobinD%2020200313.pdf
20. Weiss, J. C. (2020, February 19). A World Safe for Autocracy? Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy