It must have seemed such a wonderful utopian ideal. A movement of and by the people, bravely marching against the establishment, with no greedy ambitious men at the top seeking to exploit or subvert the revolution, in a grand collective struggle for shared goals. However, such a movement, structured in such a leaderless manner, is ultimately counterproductive to all sides of the political conflict. This essay seeks to debunk the romance of the leaderless movement, using Hong Kong to demonstrate how the incoherence of absent leadership forced protestors, local government, foreign governments and Beijing into impossibly difficult dilemmas.

Incoherence in Objective: Definitional Grey Areas in the Five Demands

Five Demands of Hong Kong Protests

1. Full withdrawal of the extradition bill
2. A commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality
3. Retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters”
4. Amnesty for arrested protesters
5. Dual universal suffrage, meaning for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive

One of the most critical flaws of the leaderlessness of the Hong Kong Protests was its effect on the already vague Five Demands. This was particularly applicable to the Second and Fifth Demand. The Second Demand for a commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality is open to much interpretation. Who will staff such a commission? What powers of investigation should it possess? What kind of legal process should it undertake? Questioning these details is not nitpicking. After all, it is reasonable to predict that any commission proposed by Hong Kong could be deemed to have too many conflicts of interest between bureaucrats, prosecutors, police officers and politicians to satisfy the protestors. Normally, in such a situation of trust breakdown between a local population and local authorities, the national government would bring in a national team to investigate. However, this would likely prove even more intolerable for Hong Kong residents who despise Beijing even more than Carrie Lam. Thus, it remains an open question: What exactly do the Hong Kong protestors want? And is it a fool’s errand to try to derive an answer to that question (which could be later be revised, as is the nature of populist demands) if the movement cannot do so on its own accord?

Similarly, the Fifth Demand, for full dual universal suffrage is fraught with issues as well. Put simply, the current Hong Kong system operates by a system in which the votes of all citizens are counted, but are crowded out by the votes of industrial and trade interests (which tend to lean pro-Beijing due to the need to do business with the mainland). In addition, Beijing maintains de facto and de jure vetoes over certain functions of the Hong Kong government. By certain interpretations, universal suffrage already exists in Hong Kong: Everyone votes. It is perfectly possible to have universal suffrage without democracy as we understand it – Imperial Germany had a more universal suffrage than Britain in 1914 (a larger percentage of adults voted), just with a weaker parliamentary system.

What then, do the Hong Kong protests actually want, with regard to the Fifth Demand? Vaguely, Democracy. However, democracy is an incredibly broad church. Would protestors be satisfied with possibly mainland-educated (an increasing likelihood as the mainland education system advances) judges overturning laws passed by its legislature, as often happens in a healthy democracy? Do all protestors even want the same thing? Does the student concocting Molotov cocktails in a university siege share the same objectives as the seasoned legislator? Such questions abound, and if this sounds confusing, that’s because it is. If you don’t know exactly what the protestors want, it is likely they don’t know either.

Normally, vague demands are not an issue. Grey areas are critical towards providing wiggle room for both sides to naturally deescalate and come to a consensus. These grey areas are the space in which negotiation can occur and trade-offs can happen, where both sides can leave with an outcome that both can claim a victory, and end a mutually hurting stalemate. However, when paired with a lack of leadership, such grey areas become fatal, as there is no force to clearly negotiate within the grey area, or bring the movement in line with the final interpretation of the Five Demands.

Further Confusion: Economics and Nationalism

There were also other widespread issues in Hong Kong that muddied the waters further for the protest movement, foreign actors, the Hong Kong government and Beijing. Income inequality and high costs of living have been issues in Hong Kong for an incredibly long time, and have loomed as the possible “real” cause of the unrest. 

In addition, the spectre of total Hong Kong separatism and even colonial British nostalgia has weighed heavily on the protests. This piece will not spend too much time on the impossibility of total Hong Kong independence. It is enough to mention that such a prospect would be economically disastrous for Hong Kong, politically intolerable for China and impossible to support for any state with the vaguest of interests in East Asia. Thus, the appearance of British colonial flags, US flags and incidents of PRC flag defacement (publicized by both Beijing and protestors), have certainly added to concerns of whether a sixth demand of self-determination could emerge. Such a demand would likely be far more divisive and act as a deal-breaker for protest supporters both in the Hong Kong legislature and overseas, but the movement has thus far been unable to conclusively confirm or deny this ghost of a demand, allowing all sides to draw their own positive or negative conclusions.

This proved critical towards hardening Beijing’s position – one already usually predisposed to violence with regard to protests. After all, if the issue was not in fact directly related to the stated five demands, and rather rested within issues of economic inequality and high costs of living, then conceding to such demands would do little to stem the protests. To Beijing, uncertain conditions confirmed a certain approach. If they were unsure of how many protests were political in nature, there was simply no incentive for negotiation and absolutely no room for concession. 

This has also had tremendous implications for the possibility of foreign involvement. Without clear leadership or strictly defined terms, foreign actors were highly limited in what support they could provide for the Hong Kong protests. While general opposition to Beijing can serve as a strategic direction in the frame of Great Power Competition, foreign governments and NGOs still need a clear and distinct vision of what they are supporting before they can initiate support.

It is important to keep in mind the complexity and processes involved in Hong Kong foreign relations. Owing to its unique legal position and substantial financial-trade role, Hong Kong has acquired a set of relationships largely decoupled from the mainland which are maintained through specific legal mechanisms, which extend far beyond trade and tariff exemptions. For instance, the US has cooperated with Hong Kong authorities in fighting money laundering and drug trafficking. With such a large bureaucratic mass in place with regard to Hong Kong, it is clear how structural inertia could stall policy changes at the best of times. With the lack of clarity in Hong Kong and the typical dysfunction of the Trump administration, it is even more clear how any US policy has been effectively stonewalled.

Strategic Absence or Absence of Strategy?

In addition, a lack of clear hierarchy and leadership has led to an inability to conduct clear strategy, particularly with regard to the absence of a clear narrative or PR campaign. This is a unique issue separate from the incoherent objectives, and more to do with the lack of any clear organized infrastructure for conducting media campaigns. 

In real terms, it refers to situations which fatigue reporting and news audiences, such as lack of clear coherent evolution in protests or any clearly defined shifts in the movement. After all, one can only track a movement so long when every new protest appears the same, albeit with shifts forwards and backwards in scale. With no clear arc of progression in objectives, tactics or personalities, media exhaustion was quick and public attention ended quickly.

This lack of media strategy was made even more clear due to the relatively far more advanced and strategic approach of Beijing’s propaganda machine. Beijing had two objectives: localizing the Hong Kong issue to prevent political subversion from leaking over to the mainland and creating uncertainty to further deter foreign interference. The second objective was relatively straightforward to accomplish – following the Russian model of simply flooding social media with blatant propaganda was enough to create confusion and inject bad faith into Western discourse, and maybe convince a handful of useful idiots along the way. For the first objective, the CCP worked extensively to portray Hong Kong protests as a rebellion against not just the Hong Kong government and Beijing, but a revolt against the Chinese people. Moving away from the initial “law and order” narrative (likely the default position taken in lieu of any specifically crafted strategy), Chinese propaganda focused a large part of the conversation on the plight of mainland students caught up in anti-mainland riots. This included running dramatic stories of pro-Beijing legislator Junius Ho running to save mainland student protests trapped in the Chinese University of Hong Kong by insidious black-shirted figures, but as a whole focused on the themes of rescue and evacuation, playing on classic tropes that Western audiences might remember from the famous Dunkirk evacuation but are known to Chinese audiences through propaganda films such as Wolf Warrior II and Operation Red Sea (though, perhaps this narrative might extend further to the historic evacuation stories of the Long March and the retreat to Chongqing).

Conclusion: A Missing Endgame

One could argue that all the many drawbacks caused by the leaderlessness of the movement have been resolved by the great groundswell of public morale caused by the inspirational factor of leaderlessness, a form of power that has swung the balance of power radically towards the Hong Kong protestors. However, this neglects the fact that the value of power is always in part at least determined by its translatability into other forms of power. Military power, or the power of violence, for instance, can easily be translated into economic power and political power in the short-term. The power of mobilized Hong Kong public morale, however, does not easily translate into international support, economic bargaining power or political control in the Hong Kong or Chinese systems.

Moreover, even if public morale was actually boosted by the leaderlessness of the movement (a proposition impossible to prove or disprove), and even if it provided an easily translatable form of power, one would still eventually have to come to the negotiating table. Every conflict, even ones involving unconditional surrender, must inevitably end with some sort of agreement. Whether it be written into law or accepted as a de facto reality, some sort of modus vivendi must eventually be reached. Leaderlessness makes this impossible and thus forces a perpetually inconclusive conflict for all sides involved.

Leaderlessness creates a situation where it is impossible to win, and losing is as painful and difficult as possible. For the sake of Hong Kong and China, the protest movement must realize that as quickly as possible.

Further Reading

Bland, Ben. “Hong Kong Climbdown Eases External Pressures on China.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, June 17, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/hong-kong-climbdown-eases-external-pressures-china
Cheung, Alvin YH. “Another Worry in Hong Kong: The Growing Partisanship of the Civil Service.” War on the Rocks, June 18, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/another-worry-in-hong-kong-the-growing-partisanship-of-the-civil-service/
Chow, Vivienne. “As Hong Kong Wards off Coronavirus, Authorities Struggle to Win Trust.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, January 31, 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/hong-kong-wards-coronavirus-authorities-struggle-win-trust
Hess, Patrick. “Quo Vadis Hong Kong?” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, November 22, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/quo-vadis-hong-kong/
Jung, Chauncey. “China’s Changing PR Strategy for the Hong Kong Protests.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, November 23, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinas-changing-pr-strategy-for-the-hong-kong-protests/
Li, Audrey. “Why China’s Rulers Won’t Admit They Could Be Wrong.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, June 17, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-s-rulers-won-t-admit-they-could-be-wrong
Lim, Jason. “Hong Kong’s Political Trouble Is Singapore’s Gain.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, July 24, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/hong-kong-s-political-trouble-singapore-s-gain
Logan, Sarah. “Battleground States: Twitter and Facebook Ban Chinese-Linked Accounts.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, September 2, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/battleground-states-twitter-and-facebook-ban-chinese-linked-accounts
Nathan, Andrew J. “How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis.” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Magazine, December 10, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis
Rose, JJ. “How China Is Winning the Hong Kong Propaganda War.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, November 19, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-winning-hong-kong-propaganda-war
Rose, JJ. “Hong Kong Protesters Need a Narrative – Now.” Lowy Institute. The Interpreter, October 25, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/hong-kong-protesters-need-narrative-now
Smith, Graeme. “Closing the Umbrella? The Verdict on Democracy in Hong Kong.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, April 9, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/closing-umbrella-verdict-democracy-hong-kong
Tiezzi, Shannon. “Beijing Is Still Sticking by Carrie Lam.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, December 17, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/beijing-is-still-sticking-by-carrie-lam/
Tong, Kurt. “Do No Harm in Hong Kong.” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Magazine, December 9, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/do-no-harm-hong-kong
Wong, Brian. “How Hong Kong’s District Council Elections Offer a Way out of the Political Crisis.” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, November 28, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/how-hong-kongs-district-council-elections-offer-a-way-out-of-the-political-crisis/
Yu, Verna. “Hong Kong: ‘Revolution Is War, and No War Is without Bloodshed’.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, August 31, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/31/hong-kong-revolution-no-war-is-without-bloodshed-protesters