In the brutal world of geopolitics, it might seem like the rook’s existence is a sorry one. Acting as a key pillar of the US-centric liberal order, after all, often drags one into the treacherous conflicts arising from superpower competition without granting it the decision-making space to set the terms and context of such engagements. However, with tact and strategy, it is possible to maintain both substantial strategic flexibility and remain a faithful ally, and in the process carve out one’s place at the high table of international politics. The thesis of this piece is that between perceptions of both American unreliability and Chinese malice, Japan has successfully emerged as a new leading actor, granting it tremendous latitude to increase and exercise power.

Leaving a Void

Even with a cursory knowledge of current affairs, it is easy to see why many Asian states have lost faith in long-term US partnership. In both rhetoric as well as policy, the United States has demonstrated a lack of reliability with regard to its ability to act as either an honest regional mediator or strong supportive ally. While it has expressed interest in Asian issues, such as North Korea and Chinese containment, there has been a notable reduction in actual engagement between the US and Asia partners in addition to notable instances of hostility towards US allies. This has been best exemplified by US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement designed to compete with expanding Chinese trade influence. However, other issues, such as US demands for US$5 billion (a 400% increase) to cover the cost of maintaining its military presence in Korea, have also made it clear that continuing to rely on the US has become ever more domestically politically expensive and strategically questionable.

However, the question remains – why not China? With its vast economic resources and historic legacy as de facto Asian superpower, China might seem like the ideal candidate to fill in the gap left by US hegemony.

While decreasing US-Asia engagement might push some states into the claws of China, there still remains a tremendous degree of scepticism about both China’s ability and will to act as a regional superpower (questions explored in a previous article), and about China’s ability and will to act as a benevolent superpower. While small Asian states might not care much about Chinese internal repression (be it in Hong Kong or Xinjiang), they do care about Chinese conduct as a regional power. Recent incidents of China supplying its fishermen with reinforced steel hulls for the purposes of ramming other (often Indonesian) fishermen have indicated to small Asian states that China is willing to trade long-term regional cooperation and goodwill for short-term economic gain or nationalistic chest-thumping. Hence, while many states have been pushed away by an untrustworthy US, Chinese avarice has made China an unappealing partner as well. This has opened the door for Japan to further reinforce its position as the new leading member of a liberal Asian order.

A Rising Sun

This process was perhaps best exemplified in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Originally designed by the United States as a trade agreement to draw Asian states away from China and towards the US, the Trans-Pacific Partnership looked to be in dire straits due to US President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement. With its leader and architect gone, the TPP seemed to lack both purpose and powerful committed participants. However, due to active Japanese engagement, the TPP, under a new name of TPP-11, managed to stay alive and thrive under Japanese leadership. On top of its membership which stretches from Southeast Asia, Latin America, Oceania and Canada, the post-Brexit UK has expressed interest in participating in what has already become the third largest Free Trade Area in the world by GDP. While the US remains out from the agreement, parties involved have still remained very much open for US re-entry. Overall, TPP-11 has been a dramatic diplomatic coup for Japan, allowing it to establish leadership over a trade bloc built by the Americans and further Chinese containment.

From a broader strategic perspective, this new project of Japan-centric Asian order can be seen to have been even more wildly successful. This can be seen in how most US and wider Western strategy for Asia was in fact first dictated by Japan. For instance, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific principle and strategy, that now forms the centrepiece of Quad and US Chinese Containment strategy, was a term originally put into use by Tokyo and later adopted by Japanese allies. The Quad (or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) in its present form itself is also a Japanese invention, having been originally initiated in 2007 by Shinzo Abe. One can wonder how many of the wider strategies and plans guiding the US Pacific Fleet have their origins in Tokyo rather than Washington, and by extension, whether Japan has managed to, in specific avenues, transform itself into the senior partner in the US-Japan security relationship through simply being more attentive and committed to constructing strategy than its often-distracted friends on the other side of the Pacific.

Japanese power has even managed to extend beyond the Asian mainland itself. Japan has had a long history of engaging with small states from the Pacific to Africa. For instance, Japan has long been an advocate for Pacific island nations in preventing overfishing in international waters which often hurt fish stocks in the waters of Pacific states. Also often forgotten is that, long before China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Japan was the Asian Power in Africa, with many soft power projection and aid projects centred around the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. This long history of engagement has built up substantial foundations of trust and efficiencies that can extend down to the ministry-ministry or military-military level. While both these theatres are under fierce Chinese contest, Japan still possesses some key advantages, such as a far cleaner and less conflict-burdened diplomatic posture (for instance, Japanese allies need not worry about taking a strong stance on Taiwan) and the personal and institutional popularity of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling LDP at large as trusted honest brokers. In addition, it also has managed to establish a strong track record and reputation for quality high-tech infrastructure better than the Chinese, seen in its ability to acquire lucrative contracts in constructing a Botswana geothermal expansion plant and Kenyan digital broadcasting infrastructure. This ability to dominate quality high-tech infrastructure construction may well prove ever more relevant as African countries are increasingly pressed to skip past the dirtiest elements of industrialization and pursue more sustainable, greener infrastructure and economies.

With these tools, Japan possesses the latitude to pursue two broad strategic directions in both contested regions. It can choose to work with other states interested in maintaining a liberal rules-based international order and work to create a combined influence that far outstrips Beijing, such as in Africa, where combined with the US, UK, France, India and the Netherlands, Japanese-led investment is more than 500% of Chinese investment. Such a decision is likely to provide the best possible posture to contain Chinese influence, but it will require extensive consensus and coordination with other partners and will ultimately produce a form of influence in Africa divided amongst many states which may not prove productive for Japanese national interests.

Alternatively, it can choose to maximise its position as the best alternative to a Chinese order through competing with powers other than China such as the US and UK to reinforce a unitary Japanese Second Place position. While such a strategic decision will not be able to contest China influence nearly as much and could very well poison Japanese relationships with other major powers, it will likely produce a more unitary Japanese influence able to directly pursue Japanese interests and does not need to rely on extensive cooperation with possibly uninterested or incompetent allies. Currently, Japan is under no substantial pressure to commit to either strategy, and it will likely have the privilege to evaluate various factors, such as the trustworthiness of Western allies and the urgency of Chinese containment, before making a final decision.

A Celebrated Rearmament

Critically, the uncertainty, fear and anger surrounding Chinese resurgence and aggressive military actions have provided a perfect stage for Japan to announce dramatic rearmament to both foreign and domestic observers. Set against the backdrop of island-building and increasing fishing incursions from China, Japanese military expansion has been not merely accepted, but applauded by international observers eager to see Japan take a more active offshore balancing role in Chinese containment. This has allowed Japan to politically profit from unveiling or purchasing new weapons systems, such as its new domestically produced Soryu-class submarines and 42 new US-bought F-35Bs which look to use their vertical takeoff and landing capability to transform Japan’s two helicopter carriers into de facto aircraft carriers, which carry far great power projection and real military striking capability (worth noting that China at present also possesses only two aircraft carriers, with debatably less quality equipment and aircraft).

Of course, Japan has been quietly rearming for a long time already. The Soryu submarines are merely the latest in a long series of submarine models. The Izumo-class helicopter carriers which may soon carry the F-35B have been in commission since 2015. Indeed, natural disasters have honed Japanese naval capacity for quick, efficient and organized sorties, demonstrated in how the Japanese navy was able to sortie 18 ships equipped with supplies within 18 hours to respond to a 2011 earthquake with without prior notice (led by a ship able to depart within 45 minutes of the earthquake). However, the ability to expand rearming in such a public fashion is still very significant. More substantial military expansion such as the F-35B purchase might have previously raised concerns in Asia and Oceania (especially amongst both international and domestic LDP detractors who characterise the Japanese government as far-right or ultra-nationalistic), but have become completely normalised. In addition, more extensive military deployments (necessary to build up operational readiness and experience) such as naval deployments in the Middle East have become accepted as commonplace, with the only controversy stemming from the usual domestic Japanese concerns over possibly getting caught up in local conflicts. This political space to conduct overseas military deployments is likely to be critical in allowing Japan to expand and enforce its sphere of influence as Great Power Competition over the next decades.

Conclusion

The Japanese story, from backwards backwater to rogue empire to smouldering rubble and now to respected regional power is very much a story of rise, collapse and return. To many countries, American withdrawal and the resurgence of China and Russia are very worrying trends. These countries have good reason to worry. However, Japan demonstrates that with strategic wisdom and tactical deftness, it is possible to use to turn every challenge into an opportunity. Thus, countries should take note and take heart, for Japan has proved that even in the unpredictable and dangerous world of Great Power Competition, it is possible for a rook on the chessboard of wider superpower contests to become a player in its own right.

Further Reading

Axe, David. “Yes, Japan’s Izumo-Class Helicopter Carriers Are Getting the F-35.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, January 29, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/yes-japans-izumo-class-helicopter-carriers-are-getting-f-35-118306
Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Tokyo Rising.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, January 13, 2011. https://nationalinterest.org/article/tokyo-rising-3429
Erickson, Andrew S. “How Japan and the Pentagon Worked Together to Expose China’s ‘Maritime Militia’.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, January 22, 2020 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-japan-and-pentagon-worked-together-expose-chinas-maritime-militia-115676
Hyodo, Shinji, and Dmitri Trenin. “RESOLVED: Japan Could Play the Russia Card Against China.” RESOLVED: Japan Could Play the Russia Card Against China | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed January 30, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-japan-could-play-russia-card-against-china
Kersten, Rikki. “Japan-Russia: Abe’s Brutal Truth.” Lowy Institute. The Interpreter, June 5, 2018. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/japan-russia-abe-brutal-truth
Layton, Peter. “Japan’s Air Force Steps Up Its Scrambles. What Are the Risks?” War on the Rocks, April 3, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/japans-air-force-steps-up-its-scrambles-what-are-the-risks/
Maizland, Lindsay, and Beina Xu. “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance
Maliki, Anthony. “Can Japan Catch up in the Economic Scramble for Africa?” Lowy Institute. The Interpreter, September 4, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-japan-catch-economic-scramble-africa
Mizokami, Kyle. “Japan’s Diesel-Fueled Soryu-Class Submarines Are No Joke.” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, January 29, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/japans-diesel-fueled-soryu-class-submarines-are-no-joke-117911
Mizokami, Kyle. “Does Japan Still Have the Finest Navy in the Entire Pacific?” The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, January 29, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/does-japan-still-have-finest-navy-entire-pacific-118051
Nguyen, Michael, and Alexandre Dayant. “The Underappreciated Value of Japanese Aid in the Pacific.” Lowy Institute. The Interpreter, October 11, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/underappreciated-value-japanese-aid-pacific
Pajon, Celine. “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Shaping a Hybrid Regional Order.” War on the Rocks, December 17, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/japans-indo-pacific-strategy-shaping-a-hybrid-regional-order/
Taffer, Andrew. “China’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Ploy to Undercut the US-Japan Alliance.” The Interpreter. The Interpreter, September 5, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-senkakudiaoyu-islands-ploy-undercut-us-japan-alliance
Takahashi, Sugio, and Eric Sayers. “America and Japan in a Post-INF World.” War on the Rocks, March 8, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/america-and-japan-in-a-post-inf-world/